I INTRODUCTION
As the recent sovereign debt crisis unfolded, German states (Bundesländer) experienced significant changes in their fiscal circumstances, and their borrowing costs increased sharply. Substantial interstate differences in borrowing costs have also recently been seen. For example, the state of North Rhine Westphalai paid more than 80 basis points more on their state-level bonds than did other Western states in 2009. The relative yields on debt issuances by North Rhine Westphalia and Hamburg have diverged by as much as 120 basis points. Such significant disparities in German state-level borrowing costs are relatively unprecedented. Though they certainly reflect divergent state-level economic conditions that were amplified by the European sovereign debt crisis and the global recession, they may also reflect more 'structural' factors such as differences in state-level political institutions and regional patterns of public finance.
For example, Poterba & Rueben (2001) show that in the 1990s yield spreads of US state bonds over federal benchmark instruments differed depending on the question whether a state's fiscal policy was subject to tight antideficit rules or not. Building on the methodological approach of Poterba & Rueben (2001) , Nadler & Hong (2011) raise an analoguous question with regard to the issue whether yield spreads in US subnational bond markets reflected characteristics of state specific politics in the recent financial crisis. Federal and state governments are highly intertwined within the context of German fiscal federalism. As a consequence, the allocation of state revenues and expenditures is a highly political issue. We therefore analyze yield spreads in German state bond markets so as to find out in how far investors discount politics when assessing state specific credit risks. Given the dramatic economic disparities that continued to prevail between East and West Germany after reunification 1990 (Hunt 2000) our investigation also includes observations on regional differences in Germany. This approach is mainly motivated by Neuberger (1999) who reports that financing practices of German banks differed with regard to East and West German enterprises. Banks were often "too restrictive in their lending" toward East German companies in the decade after the fall of the Berlin wall. In light of the imbalanced economic and strucutral conditions that still separate Western and Eastern parts in Germany, we use the crisis of 2008-2010 as a testing ground for investigating whether state bond markets also discount for regional differences between East and West Germany.
II LITERATURE
The general issue of government credit risks has been well researched in context of developed and developing economies (e.g. Edwards, 1984; Min, 1998 Credit risks have been discussed with respect to differences in states' fiscal performance as well as with regard to varying institutional factors (Baldacci, Gupta & Mati (2011) . Conceptual roots of the institutional approach reach back to Hibbs (1977) (Schmidt 1996 ; cf. also Seitz,2000) . Studies like Alesina & Sachs (1988) have complemented this approach focusing on informal factors such as differences in party politics to explain risk differences (Seitz 2000 ). Yet disagreements exist as to which part of the political spectrum delivers fiscal policies that are more sustainable (Roubini and Sachs 1989a, 1989b We pay particular attention to institutional factors as proposed by Alesina (2010), Poterba & Rueben (1997 ) and Nadler & Hong (2011) . Motivated by existing studies which show that in private capital markets investor sentiments have been influenced by Germany's history and division into two different economic systems after WWII (BDI, 1994 , Carlin & Richthofen, 1995 , Neuberger, 1999 we also test for investor perceptions with regard to differences between states in the territories of the old FRG and the former GDR.
III BACKGROUND
Schulz & Wolff (2009) provide a detailed picture of the history, structure and scope of German state bond markets. We aim at complementing their work by discussing in how far differences in institutions and politics impact the behavior of investors in these markets. Our research is focused on yield spreads of state bonds over government benchmark equivalents ("Bund") that we assume to represent investors' opinions with regard to "the subnational government's capacity and willingness to repay ... debt obligations in full and on time" (Liu & Tan, p.4) . In particular, we aim at understanding in how far investors perceive of formal and informal rules that govern the relations between central and state governments as determinants of state credit risks. Fox (2002) (Seitz 1998 , 0.184). Within the highly intertwined environment of fiscal federalism in Germany, the identity of the state-governing party might for example matter for the ability of a distressed state government to reach consensus with other state and federal governments so as to attract vertical and horizontal transfers for bailout.
In light of the existence of structural imbalances in reunified Germany investors might include additional factors into their calibrations of a state's willingness and ability to repay debt.
As of 2009, GDP per capita in East Germany had risen above 60% of West German levels but hourly labour costs remained 80% of those in the West. Wage differences and continuously high unemployment rates resulted in net emigration. "The populaion of the former GDR declined by 1. Billion Euros of the so-called "Solidarity Pact 2" in addition to existing transfers (Seitz 2006) . Given the fact that East German states still received on average about a fifth of their revenues in form of transfers from the federal government between 2005 and 2009, we are interested in finding out if credit markets reflect regional differences between the East and the West in their decisions about the relative risk of Western and Eastern German state bonds.
IV METHOD
Our work follows Poterba and Rueben (2001) in defining budget ''shocks'' that are revealed within a state's fiscal year. Specifically, fiscal shocks are defined as
(1)
where Def shock it in Equation (1) is the unexpected deficit shock in a given fiscal year t in state i, which is our measure of a budget "shock". The unexpected deficit shock equals the difference between unexpected revenue (Revshock it ) and unexpected expenditure (Expshock it ). Each component is defined by the difference between forecast revenues or expenditures before the beginning of the fiscal year and the revenues or expenditures that would have been collected during the fiscal year, given actual economic conditions.
As Poterba & Rueben (2001) developed their framework for US contexts where horizontal and vertical transfers are less relevant than in the German fiscal equalization system, we also try unexpected change in transfers and debt instead of fiscal deficit shock defined in Equation (1), but as regression estimates were almost identical, we present our estimates with the fiscal deficit shock variable.
The central question of our interest is whether the bond market's reaction to an unexpected deficit shock depends on institutional and political factors. We begin our analysis by focusing on the share of "left political party" in state's legislature. In other words, we aim to estimate whether unexpected deficit shock is more easily transmitted to state's risk of default when the share of "left political party" is higher. To examine this question, we interact our measured unexpected deficit shock (Def shock it ) with the share of "left political party" in state's legislature controlling for economic conditions each state has faced. The equation we estimate takes the form
where R it denotes the difference between the Treasury yield and the yield on bonds issued by each state. East it , and X it are the share of "left political party" and economic covariates of state i in fiscal year t, respectively. Among various economic variables, we control for the three economic variables that turn out to have the most significant effect on dependent variable : unemployment rate, the overall size of a state's economy measured by real GDP, and state budget deficit to GDP.S i is a set of unobservable that is specific to state i but time invariant. As S i is unobservable, we first-differentiate Equation (4) in order to get rid of S i and have the following equation:
where ∆ denotes time-difference operator. The dependent variable, R it , is the difference between the maximum and minimum yield spread of state i in a given year t. To explore the robustness of our findings, we also use an yield spread of statei averaged for a given year t or for December of each year t and we find that our result does not depend on the various measures of our dependent variable. When computing daily spreads we note that not all bonds issued on state level can be matched with government bonds that are equivalent in structure and residual maturity.
We solve this issue by using data on spreads of state bond yields over equivalent benchmark redemption yields directly provided by Datastream.
We cluster our data into four groups according to years of residual maturity of the respective bond at the date of yield observation. Within each cluster we average yield spreads of bonds issued by identical states over respective government benchmark redemption yields.
We now can calculate average spreads for each state within each of the four groups. We observe that within each of the four groups, average values of bond spreads differ across states. Like Schulz & Wolff (2009) we observe that average spreads of Jumbo bonds are among the lowest in the sample. We interpret the fact that this finding is consistent with results of other researchers as confirmation of our procedure. We focus our analysis on maturity class 2 as this is the sample with the largest number of bonds. When testing for the relevance of party-identity for state specific risk perceptions, we apply different approaches. The German party landscape is dominated by five parties:
The CDU (the Christian democratic party), the FDP (the liberal party), the SPD (the social democratic party), and the Green party. To be able to differentiate between residual effects due to economic and institutional characteristics and factors that are correlated to differences in recent history and/or geographic situation of German states, that may influence investors' sentiments, we introduce a dummy variable for bonds being either issued by an Eastern German state (1) or not (0). We aim at separating effects due to "Easterness" from other effects that are specific to states in the former territory GDR, i.e. parliamentary and governmental relevance of parties at the far left (Die Linke/PDS), and differences in electoral participation. We account for differences in political participation by computing voter turn-outs as recorded in the statistical yearbooks (2007 -2010).
Liquidity measure
German subnational bond markets are characterized by liquidty differences that lead to varying transactions costs and thus may impact spreads of state bonds over government equivalent benchmarks (Schulz & Wolff (2009, p.68 In analogy to our calibrations of state specific average spreads we rely on daily information provided by Datastream on "those bonds used to compute the respective average" spread curves in our model (Schulz & Wolff, 2009) . We obtain values for each state within each of the four different maturity classes. Analoguous to our focus on daily bond spreads we focus on data in maturity class II in context of our further analysis.
VI FINDINGS
The main empirical results are presented in Table 3 in which we use state bond's spread as a proxy for states' risk. The first column is a regression of change in spread on a number of economic variables: changes in GDP, unemployment rate, vertical transfer from federal government, and horizontal transfer from other states, and liquidity. As expected, size of the economy measured by GDP and unemployment rate have a positive association with an increase in state's risk, whereas transfer has a little but negative association. This result is consistent with studies that identify the size of the economy as the most important determinant of state's risk in the U.S. during the financial crisis.
The second column reports that budget deficit shock has a positive and significant association with a state' risk. An unexpected increase in budget deficit by a one billion EUR is associated with additional 16 percentage points increase in state bond spread. However, this estimate rises to 50 percentage points for "Eastern States". In other words, an unexpected budget deficit has had a greater negative impacts on a state's risk in "Eastern states". This result becomes even more significant when we control for other political variables.
In column 3, we control for the party identity of the Head of state government by including a dummy variable with a value 1 if the party of the Head of state government is the same as that of Chancellor and 0 otherwise. We also control for the interaction between the party identity of the Head of state government and budget deficit shock to have a more flexible functional form. As we see in column 3, the estimated impacts slightly increase.
In columns (4) and (5), we also present a model with the share of SPD in state legislature as a control variable. In order to have a clearer interpretation of the model, we take an average share of SPD as a control. Taking average of SPD party share in the model is justified as there were little change in the share in our data set as it covers a relatively short period of time. In addition to SPD, we also include other political states in order to see whether the results in columns (2)- (5) are robust to different specifications.
We found that those added political parties did not have significant impact on the model and the results in (2)- (5) remains significant.
Easterness vs. Die Linke
Taken altogether, estimates in Table 3 show that Eastern states had a higher increase in borrowing costs in response to a budget shock even after we control for key economic and political variables.
Then, why do Eastern states have a higher increase in risk in response to a negative economic shock? There might be many different explanations for this finding, but in this paper we try to focus on whether we find evidence that the share of the left party (Die Linke) is associated with the result presented in Table 3 . The left party (Die Linke) is more influential in Eastern states. Thus it might be that the policies proposed by the left party or simply their presences in either the government or legislature are correlated with the observed higher borrowing costs. To test this argument, we estimate Equation (5) with the left party's control of the government and legislature as treatment variables in place of a dummy variable indicating an Eastern state. Table 4 presents the result. Column (1) uses a dummy variable indicating whether left party (Die Linke) participates in the government or not, and column (2) uses the share of left party (Die Linke) in the state legislature as the treatment variable. We see that both estimates are statistically significant; in other words, a higher left party share in either the government or legislature is associated with a higher increase in borrowing costs in response to a negative budget shock. However, the results in column (1) and (2) are not robust to different specifications. For example, Eastern states had a lower average voter turnout during 2006-10, and we find that a lower democratic participation measured by voter turnout is highly associated with a higher borrowing costs in response to a negative budget shock, as presented in column (3).
Furthermore, the coefficients in column (1) and (2), which measures the impact of a change in the left party, are no longer statistically significant when we add a democratic participation as a control in column (4). These evidences suggest that there might be factors other than the share of the left party, which exposes Eastern states to a higher risk. Table 3 : Standard errors in parentheses *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.10 Table 4 : 
VII CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our investigation confirms existing results on the economic effects of state political institutions. In analogy to previous studies we found that both the presence of various fiscal rules as well as political institutions affect the average borrowing costs of states within a federal framework. Moreover, this paper presents new evidence on three issues.
First, by studying how the German state bond market reacted to unexpected deficit shcoks we present clear evidence of a link between state finances and changes in the required yield on general obligation debt. This finding adds to ongoing discussions on the question in how far bond markets perceive of German states as entities that can default. It implies that during the financial crisis bond markets were discounting state specific factors when evaluating state default risks. In a world of unconditional and universal bailout guarantees state specific factors should not impact state default risks. We hence interpret our finding as reflection of investor assumptions according to which state bailouts by the federal government would be carried out at non-zero costs.
Second, we were surprised to observe that Eastern states displayed higher increases in borrowing costs in response to budget shocks. This observation holds even after we controlled for key economic and political variables. While some studies hold that capital markets discounted "Easterness" as risk factor during the 1990s (cf. above) we are not able to reject the hypothesis that there may be other factors that explain our observations. For example, systematic differences in yields of Eastern and Western German states could also be explained by variances in parliamentory fractions held by far left parties such as "Die Linke / PDS". In this case our observation could be explained by partisan approaches that assume investors to differentiate between various parties with regard to fiscal prudence and bailout policies. Similar reasoning applies with regard to differences in electoral participations that are lower in the East than in the West. Hence, further analysis is necessary to isolate additional factors so as to be able to better explain this part of our observations. This analysis should most likely contain explorative elements testing for factors that we might have overseen in our present analysis.
Third, we find that fiscal institutions such as vertical and horizontal transfers matter. As the regression tables show, we have to be careful in the interpretations of our results before we can draw certain conclusions. States that are net recipients of fiscal transfers seem to face lower borrowing costs than states that do not receive those benefits. With regard to vertical transfers a potential explanation might be that markets assume that it is easier for states that already receive transfers to file for additional funds than it is for other states to forsake their status of independence and to tap federal resources for the first time. In case of horizontal transfers ambiguities prevail. On the one hand, bond markets may assume states that are already receiving transfers from other states to be in a better position to negotiate additional funds in case of distress than states that are net payers of vertical transfers. On the other hand, markets may discount obligations of net paying states within the context of the German transfer system as additional liabilities and burden on the fiscal independence of these states. Our findings open up questions on the role of transfers in context of costs and benefits of fiscal transfer unions. These questions are relevant beyond the specific case of Germany.
Some caveats remain. We will discuss four of them that we believe to be most relevant for our results. Due to analogies between our approach and the procedure suggested by Poterba & Rueben (2001) the caveats are partially identical with those suggested by the latter. They comprise of questions with regard to the "rationality of budget forecasts of both expenditures and revenues" (ibid.). For, "[t]here may be political influences on these forecasts, and the extent to which these forecasts make use of all publicly available information that could bear on the prediction is unclear" (ibid What are the prospects that limits in our research can be overcome in future investigations? In order to overcome endogeneity issues it would be necessary to find out in how far budget forecasts are truly of political nature. It would thus be necessary to look for evidence that would show that governments systematically mis-predict the future before we can make further suggestions how to alter the variable Def shock. With regard to liquidity issues we note that it is yet unclear how the recently introduced debt brake that forbids German states to take out new loans after 2020 will affect future bond issuances of the latter. We hence do not know if German state bond markets that only have been evolving since the 1990s will become more liquid over time (thus offering a natural solution to the problem of liquidity differences) or whether they will dry out. In the latter case, revisions of sampling strategies (e.g. by introducing different sub-sample categories) should be considered carefully due the fact that less liquid market would most likely imply thinner data on which observations can be based. As to the issue of state owned banks and other state guarantees researchers could exploit their ex post situation looking in form of an event study bearing in mind that not all information that is available as of today has been available to markets between 2008 -2010. To overcome the limited number of time series observations future research could add observations on analogous debt instruments that bear state guarantees. 
